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IMPROVISATION AND ONTOLOGY OF ART
Abstract 
I aim at explaining the sense in which the notion of improvisation is important 
for the ontology of art. In the first part, I criticize the widespread assumption of the 
repeatability of a musical work without transformation of its identity and defend 
Conversational Improvisational Emergentism (CIE) as the specific contribution of im-
provisation to musical ontology: in an improvisation, values and meanings of what has 
been played constrain what follows and are themselves retroactively (trans)formed by 
what follows; likewise, the performing interpretations of musical works and traditions 
reinvent their meanings and evaluation criteria, responding to past interpretations and 
opening up (as well as binding) possibilities for future interpretations. In the second 
part, I extend the scope of my investigation to art more generally. By critiquing the 
principle of «no evaluation without identification» and referring to Peter Lamarque’s 
and Joseph Margolis’ views about art ontology, I propose a transformative theory of 
artworks, which is based on the thesis of the improvisational “nature” of artistic practices 
(a thesis that I conceive of as a particular form of CIE). Its core point is that evaluative 
and performative interpretations of artworks (re)shape creatively, and retroactively, the 
meanings and the flexible identities of artworks. Accordingly, the artworks’ meanings 
and identities emerge (and are (trans)formed) through the cultural improvisational 
interactions in which artworks participate.
1. Introduction
In this paper I will defend the view that artistic practices are improvisational 
in character (which does not mean that each artwork is ontologically an impro-
visation). I call this thesis: the Improvisational Nature of Artistic Practice (INAP) 
and it consists of two complementary claims. 
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(a) The first one goes as follows: Artworks are to be conceived of in terms of 
improvisational performances that (try to) make sense. When stating this, I 
am not defending the view that all artworks are produced on the spot. This 
would be an absurd claim. Instead, I mean that artworks come out of the 
interaction between elements (forms, materials, and media) and emerge ex 
improviso out of interactions with other artworks and the artistic practic-
es (traditions, genres, styles…) they belong to. In this sense, they are an 
expression of all these elements and thus (trans)form them. The internal 
relations between the elements of the artwork as well as the interaction 
between artworks and artistic practices are of an improvisational nature1.
(b) The second claim follows from the first: Artistic practices and categories 
(genres, styles, traditions…) are in flux and the ways that they are formed 
and transformed provide an example of normativity without fixed norms2. 
Artistic practices and categories are not closed boxes in which to place the 
individual works of art. Instead, they are shaped by means of situated and 
responsive (interpretations of ) artworks and they too emerge ex improviso 
out of the dynamic relationships between artworks, artists, critics and the 
various parties involved in different forms of reception, interpretation and 
aesthetic evaluation. 
The argumentative strategy that follows represents the extension of the 
theoretical perspective developed in my book, Eseguire l’inatteso. Ontologia 
della musica e improvvisazione (Performing the Unexpected. Ontology of Music 
and Improvisation: Bertinetto 2016), which explores the relationship between 
improvisation and musical ontology, to artistic practices.
2. (Re-)performing the unexpected
The principal aim of the aforementioned book is to hold two apparently 
mutually exclusive theses together. I argue instead that they are theoretically 
interdependent. The two theses are the following:
• The ontological specificity of musical improvisation.
• The paradigmatic character of improvisation for musical ontology.
In order to understand how both theses are connected in a plausible and 
theoretically enriching way, it is first of all necessary to explain and discuss 
them separately.
1 Cf. Bertram 2014: 113-121; Bertinetto 2017a.
2 Cf. Bertram 2010.
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2.1. The ontological specificity of musical improvisation
Let us start with the first point: the ontological specificity of musical im-
provisation.
It can be said with certainty that the main philosophical problem of musical 
ontology hinges upon the relationship between musical works and performanc-
es3. Synthetically, the problem, and its commonly accepted solution, can be 
summarized in four steps.
• A musical work ordinarily has multiple performances, and it is 
manifested, instantiated, and repeated in them. 
• By tacitly assuming the “no entity without identity” principle 
(Quine 1969: 23), the mainstream conception requires that the 
multiple repetitions of the musical work by/in its performances 
do not change the substance of the work. To put it bluntly: 
although repeatable, the musical work does not suffer a loss 
(or transformation) of identity and remains the same through 
different performances. 
• This thesis is seemingly descriptive in character. However, it 
involves a rigid normative constraint which can be formulated 
as follows: the performances of a musical work must portray 
it correctly in order to repeat it faithfully, so as not to change 
its identity. This prevents the work from becoming a different 
entity.
• The commonly accepted explanation of the problem of how a 
musical work can be repeated in different performances with-
out undergoing ontological transformations is the dichotomy 
between (ideal or normative) Type and Tokens4. A musical work 
can be repeatedly manifested through different performances 
the same way a single type is a metaphysical structure that can 
be multiply instantiated (correctly and incorrectly) in different 
physical tokens. Following an established convention, I call this 
view structuralism.
Setting aside complications, my point is simple: the mainstream solution 
of music ontology “does not offer an adequate explanation of the ontolog-
ical nature of musical improvisation”5. Improvisation escapes the duality 
3 There is a vast literature on this topic: see for instance Davies 2001, Kivy 2002: 202-250, 
Dodd 2007, Levinson 1990 and 2011, Giombini 2017.
4 Cf. Bertinetto 2012a: 108-113.
5 I use here Puy’s 2018 (335) paraphrase of Bertinetto 2012a, which, with a pragmatic 
self-contradiction, confutes his own claim that the meaning of my expression “the type/token 
theory does not fit for musical improvisation” is unclear.
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between work and performance. Although, as I have explained at length 
elsewhere (Bertinetto 2012a: 106; Bertinetto 2016: 69-73) improvisation 
is not ex nihilo and is always a matter of degree, there is no improvisation 
without the coincidence of invention and performance. Furthermore, in the 
performing arts, setting aside the complication of recordings (on this see 
Bertinetto 2016: 161-188), musical improvisation implies the coincidence 
of process and product as well as the contemporaneity of performance and 
perceptual experience. Hence, in the case of listening to an improvisation, 
it makes sense to say that listeners directly witness not only musicians’ 
interpretive skills, no matter how creative their performances may be, but 
also their creative activity in shaping artistic content to the moment in a 
specific situation. Conversely, the most relevant part of the content of a 
musical work, so the type/token theorist would say, is already there present 
as a structural type6.
According to the view, which considers the coincidence of invention and 
performance as the definitional property of improvisation which distinguishes 
between an item’s essential and constitutive properties7, an indicative (albeit 
approximate) list of the ontological essential and constitutive properties of 
improvisation may be articulated as follows8.
6 It is ironic that by denying this difference between improvisation and the performance 
of a composition, one actually makes an argument in favor of the thesis I defend, because 
this move sounds very much like admitting the paradigmatic character of improvisation for 
the musical practice. However, two clarifications are in order here to avoid misunderstand-
ings (such as Puy’s 2018: 334-338). (1) As I have argued, there is an important difference 
between creativity in performing interpretation of musical works and creativity in improvised 
music. In a sense, both may be thought of as improvisation (which, as I argued, is a matter 
of degree), but only the second is intentionally improvisational, meaning that the aesthetic 
content of the musical production is generated intentionally on the spot. This implies that, 
if an interpretational performance generates its aesthetic content on the spot (which is a 
matter of degree, to be judged on a case by case basis), then it is an improvisation (as it 
happens in the majority of the interpretations of jazz tunes: see Bertinetto 2012a: 119-120; 
Bertinetto 2016: 142-160). (2) That said, and as I defend in this paper, the difference between 
interpretation and improvisation is completely compatible with the idea that improvisation 
is the paradigmatic musical practice in virtue (a) of the performative nature of music and 
(b) of the kind of “logic” – a retroactive normativity – that rules the interaction between 
musical works and performances. Unfortunately Puy 2018 misses this point. 
7 Definitional properties are properties that are parts of the definition of the item and consti-
tutional properties are properties having the power to give an organized existence to something, 
forming parts or constituents of something.
8 I have discussed them in Bertinetto 2012a, 2012b and 2016.
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(a) Essential features of improvisation9
• Situationality & Situativity: Improvisation occurs here and now; 
it is agency ontologically bound to its contextual environment 
(as constitutive element of the action). 
• Singularity: its space-temporal conditions are parts of its being: 
no two improvisations are identical. Copies, imitations, repeti-
tions are by definition not improvisations.
• Irreversibility: corrections are parts of the process/product.
• Authenticity: agents are authors of their performances.
(b) Constitutive features of intentional artistic Improvisation
• Responsivity: the capacity of good reaction and adaptation to 
(as well as exaptive10 impact on) environmental conditions.
• Interactivity: horizontal and vertical interaction among different 
agents (norms, factual/empirical conditions, cultural constructs, 
individual and collective subjects).
• “Normativity without norms” (Bertram 2010): improvisation 
develops its own norms accordingly to the specific situation of 
its occurrence, so that its norms are not merely presupposed, 
but are articulated and realized in/through the practice. 
The properties listed above clearly indicate that the traditional ontology of 
music, based on the concept of musical work, is inadequate to account for this 
artistic practice. Musical improvisation is not a work that can be interpreted 
more than once, nor is itself a performance of a work. However, in order to 
explain the ontological properties of improvisation, structuralists tend to force it 
9 Of course, these are generally properties of events and, obviously, also performing interpretations 
of musical works possess them. The point (again misconceived buy Puy 2018) is that perform-
ing interpretations are events that realize a musical work (a construct that becomes concretely 
existent only through the performances), and, according to the type/token ontological theory, a 
normative-prescriptive relation is in place between the performances as tokens and the work as 
ideal type. Precisely this normative-prescriptive relation does not rule improvised performances: 
there certainly may be tokens of many types, but, as I have argued elsewhere (Bertinetto 2012a: 
109-113; Bertinetto 2016: 118-129), either (a) they do not token the ideal or normative types 
that are the only types relevant for the type/token musical ontology (that must account for the 
possibility of correct and incorrect performances of a work) or (b), if they instantiate normative 
types (a musical genre for example), they do so in a way other than the one the structuralist 
version of the type/token theory allows for performances of musical works. However, my point 
is stronger: the structuralist type/token theory does not work for musical ontology, because it 
misconceives the working of normativity in the relation work/performance, as improvisation 
exemplarily shows.
10 Briefly, exaptation means making the situation or the environment appropriate through and 
for the performing action. It is complementary to adaptation to the situation or the environment.
15
into the traditional account of the relationship between work and performance 
provided by the type/token dichotomy, thereby creating conceptual acrobatics.
(a) A first acrobatic act (performed by Kivy 1983) consists in con-
ceiving of improvisation as a performing interpretation that dis-
covers the work-type as it manifests it, tokening it for the first 
time.
(b) A second acrobatic act (performed by Dodd 2013) consists in 
maintaining that a structure like that of a jazz standard is fixed 
and immutable, although it can be repeated through improvisa-
tional interpretations.
However, these acrobatics do not work.
(a) Kivy’s acrobatics do not work for the following reasons:
• First, it conflicts with the normative requirement of the main-
stream structuralist solution, in that the work-type discovered 
by an improvisational performance is not normative. Consider 
the following: Performances of a musical work potentially 
provide incorrect instantiations of the musical work. But how 
could the first improvisational tokening possibly be incorrect? 
Furthermore, it can be reasonably assumed that, in this sense, 
any interpretative performance of a musical work discovers a 
non-normative type with a single token. So this solution would 
not be specific for improvisation’s ontology (Bertinetto 2012a: 
110-111).
• Secondly, Kivy’s idea conflicts with the essential qualities of 
improvisation. While the type discovered by improvisation is 
detachable and ontologically independent from the space-tem-
poral specific and concrete conditions of its generative tokening, 
improvisation is ontologically fragile, in that it is counterfactually 
tied to its generative conditions (Bertinetto 2016: 169).
(b) The type/token model is not apt for explaining the ontological relationship 
between a jazz standard and the improvisational interpretation of that 
standards. While an ontological structure like a type is repeatable without 
transformation in/through its tokens, the standard jazz tune is not repeatedly 
instantiated in different performance without transformation. Only partic-
ular realizations of the standard concretely exist. Standards are, as it were, 
abstractions of concrete particulars (the performances) and are modified 
by those concrete particulars (cf. Feige 2014). In other words, particular 
performances (trans)form the standard that, per se, is only the abstract fic-
tion we refer to in our cultural and linguistic practices (cf. Bertinetto 2016: 
300-302).
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2.2. The paradigmatic status of improvisation for music ontology
My strategy for solving the problem of the ontology of improvisation is radi-
cally different. It does not consist in trying to explain how improvisation fits the 
mainstream structuralist solution, e.g. ordinary analytical ontological categories. 
Moving from the idea that we need a different ontology that is better suited to 
explaining the musical experience, my strategy rather aims at reorienting musical 
ontology by leaning on improvisation as paradigmatic artistic practice. As such, my 
argumentative strategy requires two steps and a conclusion.
 (a) The first step concerns the clarification of the fundamental con-
ceptual distinction between music as concretely performed and the 
“constructionality” of the musical work which, abstracted from its 
performances, is a cultural construct, a “social object” (see Ferraris 
2015). I will argue as follows:
 Music has performative nature, so it is real (as performed or played 
back) “here and now.” Conversely, musical works are flexible constructs 
we refer to in our cultural practices. They are (perceived as) actually 
there only in/through performances. Musical improvisation is essen-
tially performative, since its process is the artistic product. Hence, due 
to the performative nature of music’s reality, it is musical improvisation 
(which is essentially performative), and not the musical work (which is 
a cultural construct), that is paradigmatic for the ontology of music.
 (b) The second step is the explanation of the transformative and 
procedural structure (or “logic”) of improvisation. In order to elabo-
rate the ontology of music based on the improvisation model, it is 
necessary to understand the dynamic and transformative structure of 
improvisation as an open and recursive processual system in which 
each event is potentially unforeseen, unpredictable and emergent. 
This undetermined status remains through the events that follow, 
(trans)forms retroactively the sense of the past and its significance 
is in turn retroactively (trans)formed by what happens next (see 
Bertinetto 2016: 263-276).
 (c) Finally, my point is that precisely this transformative dynamic 
“structure,” which typifies improvisation is exemplary for the rela-
tionship between musical works and performances (as well as for 
the relation among different musical works: cf. Feige 2014).
(a) Let us now move to the first step:
The thesis of the constructionality and flexibility of the musical work involves 
the rejection of two ideological dogmas (that the mainstream structuralist 
musical ontology misconceived as ontological basic truths) that miss musical 
works’ cultural origin and ontological “nature” as human artefacts and cultural 
constructs. 
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• The first dogma is the view of musical works as metaphysically 
fixed entities with invariant identities. 
• The second dogma is the repeatability of the musical work 
without transformation of identity. 
I propose a different model against these dogmas to fit our practices better 
than mainstream ontological structuralism (which serves the unrealistic Werk-
treue Ideal). My argument for defending the ontological constructioned status 
and flexibility of musical works goes as follows.
i. Only as performed, musical works are empirically and con-
cretely real as music that is perceived and experienced (empir-
ical observation). 
ii. Performances are concrete events; musical works are not con-
crete events. 
iii. Hence, performances cannot be repetitions of a musical work 
(which is not a concrete event). For, the definition of repeti-
tion implies that something can be repeated only by some-
thing of the same nature (otherwise it is not a repetition).
iv. The relation between performance and musical work is not 
a relation of repetition. It is a relation of realization. Perfor-
mances give reality to the musical work, which without the 
performance exists only as a social-cultural object that, in 
the tradition of written music, is indicated by scores: real 
concrete objects that are not the musical work, but provide 
instructions for its realization. In a similar analogy, the score 
is related to the performance just as an architectural plan 
provides instructions for the realization of a building11. The 
performance exists; the musical work, otherwise only a cul-
tural construct, concretely exists only in/through the per-
formance.
v. The realization of the work through the performance is (trans)
formative. By realizing the musical work, each performance 
takes a stance toward the musical work as cultural construct 
and interprets the score (if there is one), mostly taking into 
account other past renditions. Performances appropriate the 
cultural construct through the score and adapt it to the per-
forming situation, which is specific in material, technical, 
historical, social, cultural, aesthetics, and artistic terms. This 
adaptation performs – to different degrees – a transformation 
of the musical work as cultural construct (Creativity of per-
formances). 
11 I thank an anonymous referee for pushing me on this point.
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vi. Hence, the idea that performances should match musical 
works fails as a criterion for evaluating performances. Match-
ing is passed off as a criterion for preserving the assumed 
ontological identity of types (or classes) through “correct” 
performances, but in fact it is the translation of the aesthet-
ic-evaluative ideal of Werktreue, operating within the frame-
work of the classical Western tradition. It is a cultural pre-
scription (cf. Ridley 2003).
vii. (ergo) Musical works are ontologically flexible, because they 
are continually re-configured (transformed) by the perfor-
mances that bring them into reality.
viii. Abstracted from performances, musical works exist only as 
cultural constructs (fictions) we refer to (also in virtue of the 
scores as instructions for their realisation) in our changing 
cultural practices. 
ix. As a result, the identity of the musical work cannot be deter-
mined independently of its performances12. A musical work’s 
properties (i.e. its identity) are specified by performances 
and evaluations in musical practices (including testimonies 
and documents: scores, composers’ and interpreters’ anno-
tations, critical literature, recordings, transcriptions…). Per-
formances, as interpretations, are evaluative; evaluations are 
performative, in that they generate the identity of the musical 
work. Hence, to express this idea with a slogan, the operating 
principle is here “No identity without evaluation! ”. Also, the 
distinctions between good and legitimate (or correct) perfor-
mances and between essential and accidental elements of the 
musical work that seem to be a necessary condition for the 
identity of the musical work, depend on evaluations that may 
be performed and understood only in (reference to) particular 
musical performances and practices.
To sum up the first step of my argument, I defend the ontological (trans)
formability (flexibility) of musical works. This is due to musical works’ ontological 
identity depending on, and co-varying with, musical and aesthetic practices 
(and contexts). Since practices change, the identity of musical works is dynamic 
(in flux).
12 Actually, a mental reading of a score may result in a determination of the musical work. As 
an anonymous referee suggested, this could be conceived of as a silent performance of the work. 
The problem is, however, that this performance cannot be perceived and evaluated: nobody can 
know whether it is a good or a bad one. People need real performances, not imaginative ones, 
for experiencing musical works and assessing their aesthetic and artistic value.
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As a matter of fact, the standards of correctness and of (artistic) excellence 
for performances depend on musical practices. They are not established by an 
alleged metaphysical identity of musical works. Hence, if performing conven-
tions and reception methods change and if they condition the identity of the 
musical work, then the identity of a musical work as a cultural construct can 
change: (different and changing) critical and performing interpretations affect 
artistic properties of the musical works (their identity)13.
(b) Here is the second step of my thesis.
The key question at issue is the following. Why is improvisation paradigmatic 
for musically “flexible” ontology? The answer is to be found in what I call the 
transformative “logic” of improvisation. 
x. Improvisation is a (trans)formative making in which process 
and product constitute a self-referential and reflective rela-
tionship (an open system)14.
xi. In open systems outputs are reintegrated as inputs and the 
process lives on by virtue of feedback (retroactivity). As a con-
sequence, sounds (and silences) that are performed are not 
only outcomes of the production process, but feedback into 
the production process, further impacting the way the process 
will continue.
xii. Hence, as an open system, in improvisation a dialectic be-
tween plan and action is at work: improvisation – as opposed 
to the execution of a pre-established plan – takes place in a 
single phase: the plan is formed while being performed: this 
means, that also the (cultural, technical, normative, aesthet-
ic, etc.) preconditions of improvisation (its background) are 
transformed in their effective development, what is produced 
becomes a new condition for the production process.
Hence, the normativity of improvisation is shaped in/as performance (nor-
mativity is, in a way, improvised: cf. Bertinetto and Bertram manuscript). This 
can be explained by the following two claims:
13 We may accommodate this idea within the type/token ontology. In order to do so we should 
however abandon Platonism (or structuralism) and conceive of types not as abstract, uncreatable 
and unchangeable platonic universals, but rather as plastic constructs that may historically change 
due to performing and cultural interpretations. Arguing in favor of this theoretical possibility is 
work for another paper, but I consider this article as a contribution that begins to take this path. 
I thank Enrico Terrone for this suggestion.
14 An open system develops its own limits (See Luhmann 1995) in an autopoietic way (see 
Maturana and Varela 1980). Fischer-Lichte 2004 famously applied the notion of autopoiesis to 
performance art.
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(1) Improvisation generates normativity: Improvisation is not only acting on 
the basis of norms. In its unfolding, improvisation establishes norms (i.e. 
makes sense), in that each move constraints following moves.
(2) Normativity is improvised: The specificity of the situation remains unforeseen, 
but normativity should account for it. Thus, the application of norms (and 
evaluation standards) in a specific situation potentially involves, in a retroactive 
way, their (trans)formation. This relates to Wittgenstein’s famous sentence: 
“We make up the rules as we go along” (Wittgenstein 1953: § 83).
Therefore, the unexpected and unprecedented are not only what is outside the 
norm, but also what the norm requires for its own application (which suspends 
and (trans)form the norm in order to copying with reality).
Furthermore, even judgment about the value of improvisation is not guar-
anteed by the reference to pre-established criteria. The criteria for evaluating an 
improvisation are also put into play in the improvisation (both for public and 
for performers). In order to understand and evaluate an improvisation we cannot 
limit ourselves to using abstract criteria. The evaluation criteria are (re)generated 
through the performance, which suspends the normativity on which it is based, 
while it applies hic et nunc, thereby producing the unexpected.
(c) The conclusion of the argument follows: Due to both the transformative and 
retroactive normative “logic” of performance, improvisation is the model 
of musical practices. This claim can be explained as follows:
• The normative force of a musical work (or of a musical genre) 
depends on the actual performing practices (cf. Davies 2012). In 
applying the norm (consisting in a musical work, in a musical 
practice, in a musical tradition), performances realize them in 
specific ways, adapting them to concrete situations; and this 
performative application of the norm potentially (trans)forms 
the norm.
• As a consequence, the identities of musical works, musical 
practices, and traditions are ongoing construction(s): they 
are concretely real only in the performances that retroactively 
transform them.
The thesis I call Conversational Improvisational Emergentism (CIE) results from 
the arguments made thus far. It goes as follows:
The story of (performing and critical) interpretations of a musical work is the 
musical work as cultural construct. This social construct is an outcome which 
can be continuously transformed and acts as a kind of interactive conversation. Its 
meaning is not immutable as the result of a compositional act (eg. by author’s 
intentions): rather, it emerges out of cultural interactions.
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Each (performing and critical) interpretation produces meanings, thereby 
retroactively (trans)forming musical work’s meanings and identity; it is a con-
tribution (non-programmable in advance) to further re-configuration of the 
musical work’s “fictional” identity. The “dialogue” among the interpretations 
of a musical work transforms the musical work and is open because it builds 
out of itself its own normative context15.
To summarize: in an improvisation, values and meanings of what has been played 
constrain what follows and are themselves retroactively (trans)formed by what 
follows. Likewise, the performing interpretations of musical works and traditions 
reinvent their meanings and evaluation criteria, responding to past interpretations 
and opening up (as well as binding) possibilities for future interpretations.
3. Improvisation and the ontology of art
The reflections carried out so far concern music ontology. The question that 
now arises is: Is it possible to generalize this approach? 
The answer is yes. Of course, my re-orienting strategy is applicable to other 
performing arts as well, where there is a relation between an allegedly repeat-
able artwork (for instance a theatrical work) and its realizations/manifestations 
(cf. Hamilton 2007).
Furthermore, I venture that we may conceive of improvisation as para-
digmatic for ontology of art as such. My general point is that a look towards 
improvisation helps us to overcome some of the objectivistic trends in contem-
porary ontology of art (what I mean by “objectivistic” will be clear in the next 
section) and conceiving of artworks as dynamic, i.e. as (trans)formable as well 
as (trans)formative entities. In fact, like elements of improvisations, artworks 
are continuously reshaped by the interaction to which they participate, thereby 
contributing, as kinds of agents, to (trans)form artistic practices and categories 
and, consequently, also other artworks’ identities.
3.1 No identification without evaluation
As mentioned in the introduction, I call this thesis concerning the conceptual 
contribution offered by improvisation for the ontology of art, INAP: Improvi-
sational «Nature» of Artistic Practices.
INAP contrasts with largely accepted (but wrong) principle of (objectifying) 
art ontology, according to which the ontological identification of an artwork is a 
necessary pre-condition for its evaluation.
15 For this “Gadamerian” view of the relationship between musical works’ performances see 
Feige 2014.
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Against this principle, INAP highlights the performative force of evaluation 
and the evaluative impact of performance, thereby accepting the principle: “No 
identification without evaluation”. This means that the ontological identification 
of an artwork is conditioned by evaluative/interpretive practices. 
The task of the rest of the article is to argue in favour of this thesis. I will 
defend it by extending CIE to art in general.
3.2. Lamarque’s Contribution
I will begin by discussing the proposal made by Peter Lamarque. According 
to Lamarque (2010: 51), the artworks’ “identity conditions, being value-laden, 
are distinct from those of functionally-defined artefacts and physical objects in 
the natural world”.
This depends on the following reasons:
• (1) Artworks are products of human creativity (Lamarque 2010: 
42) which “essentially involves bringing something new into 
the world” (Lamarque 2010: 46). This assertion contradicts the 
Platonist view of artworks, which holds that they are timeless 
universals and, therefore, are discovered and found but not 
produced or “created” by artists (cf. Kivy 2002: 202-223). 
• (2) Artworks need “a complex cultural background of practices” 
(Lamarque 2010: 41), “appropriate beliefs, attitudes, modes of 
appreciation, and expectations” (Lamarque 2010: 54) in order 
to (continue to) be the artworks they are.
• (3) Practices, cultural contexts and their normative force are 
flexible and can change (even when they are highly structured: 
see Guala 2016).
For these reasons, artworks can change (and even disappear) depending on 
cultural practices. As Lamarque (2010: 68) writes:
Nothing can be a work (of art) if it does not play a role, or be fit to play a role, in 
a human practice where a sufficient number of informed practitioners recognize its 
status and respond appropriately. […] Works cannot survive as works if these practices 
are lost. If no-one is any longer in a position to judge that something is a work of a 
particular kind then works of that kind no longer exist. 
Lamarque is right about that: artworks’ identity depends on the cultural 
practices to which they participate. However, Lamarque’s view is crucially 
flawed in that, following the view elaborated by Kendall Walton in an extremely 
important, but partly mistaken, article on philosophy of art (Walton 1970), 
he believes that artworks can be appreciated and evaluated properly only when 
they are placed in the right categories or genres (Lamarque 2010: 75). Briefly, 
the problem is the objectification of the relation between an artwork and its 
category: according to Lamarque, evaluations (i.e. value judgements) make 
23
ontological identification possible, but they do not make sense or generate cat-
egories (genres, norms and values).
One can briefly explain the flaw of Lamarque’s view by saying that, following 
Walton, he underestimates the performative potential of interpretive evaluations. 
In this way, he misses the dynamism of the normativity of human practices16 as 
well as the specific transformative nature of artistic practices, which constitutes 
one of the greatest contributions of art to human practices.
3.3. Margolis’ Answer
To solve this problem, I will now turn to Joseph Margolis. His “hermeneutical 
pragmatism” (as I characterize his view) offers a valuable contribution to the 
question of art ontology.
Margolis (1999) properly highlights the performative role of evaluative in-
terpretations for art ontology. His argument can be explained as follows:
(a) First, like Lamarque, he defends, the grounding role of evaluation for indi-
viduating artworks. To individuate an artwork (as different from a physical 
object) is to assign it cultural/interpretive/intentional/evaluative “parts” and 
doing so belongs to the same practice of imputing meaning to the object 
by means of interpretation. 
(b) Secondly, as opposed to Lamarque and Walton, Margolis explains that 
“you cannot settle the ontology of art by imposing a priori constraints 
on the logic of interpretation” (Margolis 1999: 95). Artistic categories are 
not preconditions for ontologically identifying artworks. They are also the 
historical results of interpretative and evaluative activities with which appre-
ciators generate expectations regarding the production and the assessment 
of new artworks, thereby assigning ontological identity to artworks (cf. 
Condello-Terrone 2017: 41).
Accordingly, artworks are (1) (trans)formable and (2) (trans)formative.
(1) Artworks are transformable, because, like persons, they are, in Margolis’ fe-
licitous definition, “physically embodied and culturally emergent entities” 
(cf. Margolis 1974).
Indeed, cultural entities are not objectively fixed or invariant. They differ from 
purely physical entities, in that the numerical identification of artworks does not 
necessarily require the description of their nature by means of assigning them 
determinate and invariant properties – i.e. attributing them predicates follow-
ing bivalent logic (as pretended by neo-scholastic positions: cf. Pouivet 2017). 
16 Indeed, as we have seen, normativity is improvisational, since the rules, to be valid, must be 
plastically adapted to the specific concrete situation, and this, in turn, involves the transformation 
of the norms “as we go along.”
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The artwork’s identity can be specified only in terms of cultural properties that 
are in flux, in that they are subject to interpretive and evaluative transformations 
situated in a given cultural context and responsive to that particular context as 
well as to other interpretations. Interpretive transformations of this kind are 
rightly termed improvisations (cf. Margolis 1999: 96). They (trans)form artworks’ 
identity and are not constrained by fixed criteria of practices, genres and styles.
 
(2) Artworks are transformative, in that they are to be understood 
as performances impacting on evaluative criteria (cf. Noë 2015).
Artistic categories (genres, styles…) are not simply invariant objective properties 
that normatively qualify artworks. This is due to the fact that artworks actualize 
(realize) and (trans)form artistic categories: an artwork is not content that enters 
the category like an object we put in a box. In brief, artworks are transforma-
tive in that they intervene in reality, and include the determination of artistic 
categories, practices, genres17. Now, to understand the sense in which the work 
of art is transformable and at the same time transformative, one can resort to 
the concept of improvisation, arguing that the relationship between the work of 
art and the artistic category is improvisational. It is improvisational because the 
relation between artworks and artistic categories (genres, styles, traditions, etc.) 
is not a one-way relation of determination, but a mutual retroactive interaction. 
We can clarify this relationship by articulating its two main aspects.
i. Artistic categories develop through (interpretative evaluations of ) artworks, 
are (trans)formed through (interpretative evaluations of ) artworks, emerge 
out of (interpretative evaluations of ) artworks. 
ii. Artworks are ex improviso (cf. Bertinetto 2017). While applying the cate-
gory/norm, they help to (trans)form it. Thus, they cannot be reduced to 
pre-existing categories.
At this regard, Margolis’ example is telling. Referring to Picasso, he writes 
that “Picasso’s innovation” (with Les demoiselles d’Avignon) “cannot be routinely 
reconciled with any of the would-be canons of well-formed painting up to the 
intrusion of Les demoiselles […]” (Margolis 1999: 93). In other words, Picasso’s 
innovation – like every authentic or exemplary18 artworks – is a kind of impro-
17 Cf. Condello and Terrone 2017 (43): “As a historical outcome, a genre has an origin and 
it can undergo changes, which are triggered by new works that acquire exemplarity by virtue of 
negotiations within the genre itself as a practice”. 
18 Cf. Condello and Terrone 2017. In my view (which is openly evaluative and not classifi-
catory) this should be understood in an evaluative sense. I cannot elaborate on this point here, 
but I mean that artworks that are not able to impact on artistic genre in some way, being mere 
instantiations of artistic categories and not contributing in a qualitative way to the (trans)for-
mation of categories are “less” artistic (thus, less artworks) then artworks that – also through the 
interpretations they generate – contribute to creatively (re)shape artistic categories.
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visation on categories-norms and on other artworks, which is “open to further 
improvisation” (Margolis 1999: 94), thereby (trans)forming categories and norms.
Improvisers base their performances on a background of artistic traditions and 
aesthetic/artistic materials, forms, techniques, styles and conventions, from which 
they improvise, re-signifying this background and thus bringing it to life19. Artists, in 
this sense, are all improvisers: they bring out something new from old materials and 
forms, using and abusing them for unexpected inventions and, in this way, bringing 
them a new life (cf. Bertinetto 2018). For instance, Picasso’s improvisation with Les 
demoiselles d’Avignon, signifies and performatively interprets and evaluates, (on) the 
Cezanne painting(s) Les grand baigneuses and on African ritual masks: Old artworks 
and artistic categories get new meanings and new identities through new artworks20.
4. Conclusion: Conversational improvisational emergentism21 (CIE)
We can now draw conclusions based on the reflections made so far. Artworks 
are cultural constructs generated by interpretive and evaluative meaning attri-
butions made by different cultural entities (including persons): artworks have 
emergent identities.
The ontological identity of an artwork results out of the dynamics of artistic 
practices: production, interpretation and criticism (cf. Bertram 2014). This 
dynamic is improvisational in character: its model is the interactional relation 
between musical works and performances as well as between different perfor-
mances of a musical work. 
Indeed, improvisational (interpretive, evaluative, and performative) inter-
actions between different agents at different levels feedback into the artworks’ 
identities22. Hence, although the physical object may remain (or be restored as) 
the same, the emergent intentional (cultural) «part» is in flux and, consequent-
ly, the artworks’ identity is continuously (trans)formed through the way they 
are interpretatively and evaluatively interacted with and appropriated. 
19 For the notion of signifying in relation to improvisation see Monson 1996; cf. Bertinetto 2017b.
20 Thus, even granted Laetz’s interpretation of Walton’s paper (see Laetz 2010), according to 
which the relevant category a work belongs to is 1. perceptual and 2. “aesthetic active,” the point 
would be that the (sense and/or the effects and/or the efficacy of the) aesthetic activity of an 
artistic category may change historically (which happens with the evolution of taste, for instance), 
thereby impacting on artworks’ ontological identities. I thank A. Andrzejewski for bringing Laetz’s 
paper to my attention.
21 Notions like emergence and emergentism can be applied to the artistic field in different 
ways. For an explanation of different kinds of artistic emergentism and a defense of the philo-
sophical productivity of this view see my Bertinetto 2019, in which I explore further aspects of 
the theoretical approach proposed here.
22 Cf. Bertinetto 2017a.
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Moreover, artworks are not simply passive subjects in these interactions. 
Rather, they actively participate in those interactions, so that they impact on 
artistic criteria of evaluation and interpretation, thereby contributing to (trans)
forming them as well as other artworks. So it may be said that each artwork is 
a retroacting response to a specific situation, to artistic categories and to past 
artworks whose identities is transformed due to the performative evaluative 
interpretation enacted and embodied by the new artwork.
This can be finally explained by the construction of a structural analogy with 
the dynamics of conversations. According to Sawyer 2001, the meaning of con-
versations is emergent. This amounts to saying that conversations are creative, 
in that their meaning cannot be traced back to the semantic meaning of the 
words used, but emerges pragmatically, and creatively, out of the conversational 
interaction (see Bertinetto 2017b: 14-15).
Analogously, the interpretation of artworks is a kind of conversational dia-
logue with artworks (Cf. Carroll 1992). However, like in real conversations, this 
dialogue does not aim at discovering the author’s intentions (Huddleston 2012). 
Conversations follow conventions, norms and constraints, but the specific con-
versational situation reshapes norms, as speakers’ reciprocal interactions impact 
pragmatically on the context (and on established meanings resulting from past 
evaluative interpretations).23 Hence, artworks’ ontological identity is conversational, 
since it is not reducible to what artists claim subjectively, but it is (trans)formed 
through the evaluative and performing interpretations it obtains in its cultural life. 
In conclusion, CIE explains INAP. As paradigmatically exemplified by the 
“improvisational”-(trans)formational link between musical works and their perfor-
mances, evaluative and performative interpretations of artworks (re)shape creatively, 
and retroactively, the meanings and the flexible identities of artworks. Accordingly, 
the artworks’ meanings and identities emerge (and are (trans)formed) through the 
cultural improvisational interactions in which artworks participate. They cannot be 
simply explained by tracing them back to pre-established artistic normative catego-
ries, because they impact on those categories, (trans)forming and renewing them. 
To sum up, like in the exemplary musical case, nothing is ontologically stable 
in the artworld as both artworks’ identities and artistic categories emerge out of 
cultural interactions and are, therefore, continuously in flux24. This state of flux, 
in which each new outcome feeds back the process, retroacting on the identity of 
its elements, is typical of improvisation. As a consequence, improvisation is not an 
ontological rare beast: rather, it offers an explanatory model for the ontology of art25.
23 In Bertinetto 2017b I resorted to this idea for explaining musical meaning.
24 Cf. Hallam-Ingold 2007.
25 Previous versions of this paper have been presented in Paris on March 22nd 2018 (at the 
workshop L’expérience esthétique comme “praxis”: perception, imagination et atmosphères) and in War-
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